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Abstract
Weconsider a choice of options for an innovating firm to enter themarket with orwithout
licensing its new cost-reducing technology to the incumbent firm using a combination of a
royalty per output and a fixed license fee, or to license its technology without entry. With
general demand and cost functions we show the following results. When the innovating
firm licenses its technology to the incumbent firm without entry, the optimal royalty rate
per output for the innovating firm is zero with negative fixed fee, and when the innovating
firm enters the market and at the same time licenses its technology to the incumbent firm,
the optimal royalty rate is positive with positive or negative fixed fee. Also we show that
when cost functions are concave, the optimal royalty rate is one such that the incumbent
firm drops out of the market and license without entry strategy and entry with license
strategy are optimal for the innovator; and when cost functions are strictly convex, there
is an internal solution of the optimal royalty rate under duopoly and entry with license
strategy is optimal for the innovator.
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1 Introduction
We consider a choice of options for an innovating firm to enter the market with or without
licensing its new cost-reducing technology to the incumbent firm using a combination of a
royalty per output and a fixed license fee, or to license its technology without entry also using
a combination of a royalty per output and a fixed license fee.
In Proposition 4 of Kamien and Tauman (1986), assuming linear demand and cost functions
and fixed license fee, it was argued that in an oligopoly when the number of firms is small
(or large), entry with license strategy by the innovating firm, which is a strategy to enter the
market and at the same time license its cost-reducing technology to an incumbent firm, is more
profitable than license without entry strategy, which is a strategy to license its technology to an
incumbent firm without entering the market. We think that their definition of license fee in the
case where the innovating firm licenses its technology to an incumbent firm and does not enter
the market is not appropriate. Interpreting their analysis in a duopoly model, they defined the
license fee in that case by the diﬀerence between the profit of an incumbent firm in that case
and its monopoly profit before entry and license by the innovating firm. However, we can think
that if the negotiation between the innovating firm and an incumbent firm about the license fee
breaks down, the innovating firm can enter the market without license to an incumbent firm.
If the innovating firm does not enter the market nor license, its profit is zero. But, if it enters
the market, its profit is positive. Therefore, such a threat is credible, and hence an incumbent
firm must pay the diﬀerence between its profit in the license without entry case and its profit
in the entry without license case as a license fee.
In Hattori and Tanaka (2017a), using an alternative definition of a license fee taking the
above point into account, the following results about duopoly with a linear demand function
and only a fixed license fee have been shown.
1. Linear cost functions (constant marginal costs):
If the incumbent firm does not drop out when the innovating firm enters the market
without license, license without entry strategy is optimal for the innovating firm. This
result is converse to that in Kamien and Tauman (1986). If the incumbent firm drops out
when the innovating firm enters the market without license, both license without entry
strategy and entry without license strategy are optimal1.
2. Quadratic cost functions:
If the magnitude of the innovation is large (cost of the new technology is suﬃciently
low), license without strategy is optimal for the innovating firm, and if the magnitude of
the innovation is small, entry with license strategy is optimal.
In this paper we consider a more general situation of duopoly with an innovating firm and
an incumbent firm, in which the innovating firm imposes a combination of a royalty per output
and a fixed license fee to the incumbent firm. We analyse a case of general demand and cost
functions as well as a case of general demand and concave cost function and a case of general
demand and strictly convex cost function. We will show the following results.
1When the incumbent firm drops out of the market, the innovation is said to be drastic.
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General demand and cost function case
1. When the innovating firm licenses its technology to the incumbent firm without entry,
the optimal royalty rate per output for the innovating firm is zero.
2. When the innovating firm enters the market and at the same time licenses its technology
to the incumbent firm, the optimal royalty rate per output is positive.
General demand and concave cost function case
1. If the innovating firm enters the market and at the same time licenses its technology to
the incumbent firm, and the cost functions of the firms are concave, the optimal royalty
rate per output for the innovating firm is one such that the output of the incumbent firm
is zero.
2. The fixed license fee is negative.
3. License without entry strategy and entry with license strategy are optimal for the inno-
vator.
General demand and strictly convex cost function case
1. If the innovating firm enters the market and at the same time licenses its technology to
the incumbent firm, and the cost functions of the firms are strictly convex, the optimal
royalty rate per output for the innovating firm is positive but smaller than one such that
the output of the incumbent firm is zero.
2. The equilibrium output of the innovating firm is larger than that of the incumbent firm.
3. Entry with license strategy is optimal for the innovator.
In this case the fixed license fee may be positive or negative. Please see an example in Section
5.
In the next section we review some related studies. In Section 3 we describe the model of
this paper. In Section 4 we present the main results, and in Section 5 we study a case of linear
demand and quadratic cost functions as an example.
2 Literature review
Various studies focus on technology adoption orR&D investment in duopoly or oligopoly. Most
of them analyze the relation between the technology licensor and licensee. The diﬀerence of
means of contracts, which comprise royalties, upfront fixed fees, combinations of these two,
and auctions, are well discussed (Katz and Shapiro (1985)). Kamien and Tauman (2002)
showed that outside innovators prefer auctions, but industry incumbents prefer royalty. This
topic is discussed by Kabiraj (2004) under the Stackelberg oligopoly; here, the licensor does
not have production capacity. Wang andYang (2004) considered the case when the licensor has
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production capacity. Sen and Tauman (2007) compared the license system in detail, namely,
when the licensor is an outsider and when it is an incumbent firm, using the combination of
royalties and fixed fees. However, the existence of production capacity was externally given,
and they did not analyze the choice of entry. Therefore, the optimal strategies of outside
innovators, who can use the entry as a threat, require more discussion. Regarding the strategies
of new entrants to the market, Duchene, Sen and Serfes (2015) focused on future entrants with
old technology, and argued that a low license fee can be used to deter the entry of potential
entrants. However, the firm with new technology is incumbent, and its choice of entry is
not analyzed. Also, Chen (2016) analyzed the model of the endogenous market structure
determined by the potential entrant with old technology and showed that the licensor uses the
fixed fee and zero royalty in both the incumbent and the outside innovator cases, which are
exogenously given. Creane, Chiu and Konishi (2013) examined a firm that can license its
production technology to a rival when firms are heterogeneous in production costs, and showed
that a complete technology transfer from one firm to another always increases joint profit under
weakly concave demand when at least three firms remain in the industry.
A Cournot oligopoly with fixed fee under cost asymmetry was analyzed by La Manna
(1993). He showed that if technologies can be replicated perfectly, a lower cost firm always has
the incentive to transfer its technology; hence, while a Cournot-Nash equilibrium cannot be
fully asymmetric, there exists no non-cooperative Nash equilibrium in pure strategies. On the
other hand, using cooperative game theory, Watanabe and Muto (2008) analyzed bargaining
between a licensor with no production capacity and oligopolistic firms. Recent research
focuses on market structure and technology improvement. Boone (2001) and Matsumura et.
al. (2013) found a non-monotonic relation between intensity of competition and innovation.
Also, Pal (2010) showed that technology adoption may change the market outcome. The
social welfare is larger in Bertrand competition than in Cournot competition. However, if
we consider technology adoption, Cournot competition may result in higher social welfare
than Bertrand competition under a diﬀerentiated goods market. Hattori and Tanaka (2015)
and (2016a) studied the adoption of new technology in Cournot duopoly and Stackelberg
duopoly. Rebolledo and Sandonís (2012) presented an analysis of the eﬀectiveness of research
and development (R&D) subsidies in an oligopolistic model in the cases of international
competition and cooperation in R&D. Hattori and Tanaka (2016b) analyzed problems about
product innovation, that is, introduction of higher quality good in a duopoly with vertical
product diﬀerentiation. Recently, Sen and Stamatopoulos (2016) presented an analysis of
royalty and fixed fee under duopoly with general demand and cost functions. They did not
considered an option of the innovator whether it enter the market or not.
In this paper wewill show that a combination of non-negative royalty and negative or positive
fixed fee is optimal for the innovator under duopoly with options for the innovator to enter or
not to enter the market with or without license. On the other hand, Liao and Sen (2005) showed
that negative royalty can be optimal under oligopoly with one innovator and two incumbent
firms. When the innovator is holding relatively insignificant new technology, licensing it to
only one firm with negative royalty is optimal. This strategy leads licensee more aggressive
and getting more profit which is paid to licensor as a fixed license fee. This negative royalty
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may result in more social welfare than that where negative royalty is prohibited2.
3 Themodel
There are two firms Firms A and B. Firm A is an innovating firm and Firm B is an incumbent
firm. Although at present only Firm B produces a good and Firm A is an outside innovator,
after entering themarket FirmA also produces the same good. It has a superior new technology
and can produce the good at lower cost than Firm B.
Firm A have three options. The first option is to enter the market without license to Firm
B, the second option is to license its superior technology to Firm B using a combination of
a royalty per output and a fixed license fee, and the third option is to enter the market with
license to Firm B also using a combination of a royalty per output and a fixed license fee. If
Firm A enters, the market becomes a duopoly.
Let p be the price, xA and xB be the outputs of Firms A and B. The inverse demand function
of the good is written as
p(xA + xB).
We assume Cournot type behavior of the firms. The cost function of Firm B before adoption
of the new technology is cB(xB), and its cost function after adoption of the new technology is
cA(xB). The cost function of Firm A is cA(xA). cA(xA) < cB(xB) for xA = xB. We assume
cB(0) = 0when Firm B drops out of the market. We analyze a case of general demand and cost
functions, and also a case of general demand and concave cost function and a case of general
demand and strictly convex cost function. Furthermore, as an example, we will consider a case
of linear demand and quadratic cost functions.
4 Themain results
4.1 Entry without license
Suppose that Firm A enters the market without license to Firm B. The inverse demand function
in this case is written as p(xA + xB). The profits of Firms A and B are
piA = p(xA + xB)xA − cA(xA),
and
piB = p(xA + xB)xB − cB(xB).
The first order conditions for profit maximization of Firms A and B are
p + p′xA − c′A(xA) = 0,
and
p + p′xB − c′B(xB) = 0.
2They assumed linear demand and cost functions. Their analysis about outside innovator case is extended to
general demand and cost functions by Hattori and Tanaka (2017b).
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The second order conditions are
2p′ + p′′xA − c′′A(xA) < 0,
and
2p′ + p′′xB − c′′B(xB) < 0.
We assume that the second order conditions are satisfied in each case. Denote the equilibrium
profit of Firm B in this case by pieB.
4.2 License without entry
Next suppose that Firm A licenses its technology to Firm B using a combination of a royalty
per output and a fixed license fee, and does not enter the market. Denote the fixed license fee
by L and the royalty rate per output by r . The inverse demand function is p(xB). The profit of
Firm B is
piB = pxB − cA(xB) − r xB − L.
The first order condition for profit maximization of Firm B is
p + p′xB − c′A(xB) − r = 0.
The second order condition is
2p′xB + p′′xB − c′′A(xB) < 0.
From these conditions we obtain
dxB
dr
=
1
2p′xB + p′′xB − c′′A(xB)
< 0.
If the negotiation between Firm A and Firm B about the license fee breaks down, Firm A can
enter the market without license. When Firm A does not enter nor sell a license, its profit is
zero; however, when it enters the market without license, its profit is positive. Therefore, such
a threat is credible, and Firm B must pay the diﬀerence between its profit net of the royalty and
its profit in the previous entry without license case as a fixed license fee. The total license fee
is the sum of the royalty and the fixed license fee. L is determined so that piB = pieB is satisfied.
Thus, it is written as
L = pxB − cA(xB) − r xB − pieB.
Note that pieB is a constant number. Denote the total license fee, which is L + r xB, by TL. Then,
TL = pxB − cA(xB) − pieB.
Firm A chooses r so as to maximize TL. The condition for maximization of TL with respect
to r is
dTL
dr
= (p + p′xB − c′A(xB))
dxB
dr
= r
dxB
dr
= 0.
Since dxBdr < 0, we get the optimal royalty rate per output, r˜
l , for the innovating firm as follows.
r˜ l = 0.
We have shown the following result.
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Lemma 1. When the innovating firm licenses its technology to the incumbent firm without
entry, the optimal royalty rate per output for the innovating firm is zero.
4.3 Entry with license
Suppose that Firm A enters the market and at the same time licenses its technology to Firm B
using a combination of a royalty per output and a fixed license fee. The cost function of Firm
B is cA(·) in this case. Similarly to the previous case, we denote the fixed license fee by L and
the royalty rate per output by r . The inverse demand function is p(xA + xB). The profits of
Firms A and B are
piA = pxA − cA(xA),
and
piB = pxB − cA(xB) − r xB − L.
The first order conditions for profit maximization of Firms A and B are
p + p′xA − c′A(xA) = 0, (1)
and
p + p′xB − c′A(xB) − r = 0. (2)
The second order conditions are
2p′ + p′′xA − c′′A(xA) < 0,
and
2p′ + p′′xB − c′′A(xB) < 0.
Diﬀerentiating (1) and (2) with respect to r yields
(2p′ + p′′xA − c′′A(xA))
dxA
dr
+ (p′ + p′′xA)dxBdr = 0,
(p′ + p′′xB)dxAdr + (2p
′ + p′′xB − c′′B(xB))
dxB
dr
− 1 = 0.
Solving them, we obtain
dxA
dr
= − 1
∆
(p′ + p′′xA),
and
dxB
dr
=
1
∆
(2p′ + p′′xA − c′′A(xA)) < 0,
where
∆ = (2p′ + p′′xA − c′′A(xA))(2p′ + p′′xB − c′′A(xB)) − (p′ + p′′xA)(p′ + p′′xB).
We assume
∆ > 0.
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Also we assume
|2p′ + p′′xA − c′′A(xA)| > |p′ + p′′xA |,
and
|2p′ + p′′xB − c′′A(xB)| > |p′ + p′′xB |.
These assumptions are obtained from the stability conditions for the equilibrium of duopoly3.
Then,
p′ − c′′A(xA) < 0, p′ − c′′A(xB) < 0.
Hence,
dxA
dr
+
dxB
dr
=
1
∆
(p′ − c′′A(xA)) < 0,
and dxBdr  > dxAdr  . (3)
We have dxAdr > 0 when p
′ + p′′xA < 0 and dxAdr < 0 when p
′ + p′′xA > 0. In the former
case the goods of the firms are strategic substitutes, and in the latter case they are strategic
complements. These properties do not aﬀect the main results of this paper.
Similarly to the previous case, Firm B must pay the diﬀerence between its profit net of the
royalty and its profit in the entry without license case as a fixed license fee. The fixed license
fee should be equal to
L = pxB − cA(xB) − r xB − pieB.
The total license fee is
TL = pxB − cA(xB) − pieB.
The total profit of Firm A is the sum of the total license fee and its profit as a firm in the
duopoly. It is equal to
piA + TL = pxA − cA(xA) + pxB − cA(xB) − pieB.
pieB is constant. Firm A chooses r so as to maximize piA + TL. Diﬀerentiating piA + TL with
respect to r yields
d
dr
(piA + TL) =(p + p′xA − c′A(xA) + p′xB)
dxA
dr
+ (p + p′xB − c′A(xB) + p′xA)
dxB
dr
(4)
=p′xB
dxA
dr
+ (r + p′xA)dxBdr .
If there is an internal solution of r which maximizes piA + TL, it is
r˜el = − p
′
dxB
dr
(
xA
dxB
dr
+ xB
dxA
dr
)
.
We show that the optimal royalty rate is positive.
3See Seade (1980) and Dixit (1986).
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Lemma 2. When the innovating firm enters the market and at the same time licenses its
technology to the incumbent firm, its optimal royalty rate per output is positive.
Proof. Suppose r = 0. Then, (1) and (2) mean xA = xB. From (3)
xA
dxB
dr
+ xB
dxA
dr
< 0.
Substituting r = 0 into (4), we find
d
dr
(piA + TL)

r=0
= p′
(
xB
dxA
dr
+ xA
dxB
dr
)
> 0.
Therefore, the optimal royalty rate is positive. □
Now we consider two specific cases.
Concave cost function case
Assume that the cost functions of Firms A and B before adoption of the new technology
are cA(xA) and cB(xB) such that cA(xA) < cB(xB) for xA = xB, c′′A(·) ≤ 0 and c′′B(·) ≤ 0, or
c′A(x) < c′A(y) and c′B(x) < c′B(y) for x > y. The cost function of Firm B after adoption of the
new technology is cA(xB). From (1) and (2)
p + p′xA − c′A(xA) = 0, p + p′xB − c′A(xB) − r = 0.
Suppose xB = 0. Then,
r = p − c′A(0).
Denote this value of r by ¯¯r . It is a value of the royalty rate such that the output of Firm B is
just zero, that is, it drops out of the market. We call such a royalty rate per output prohibitive.
Also we have
¯¯r + p′xA = c′A(xA) − c′A(0) ≤ 0.
Substituting this and xB = 0 into (4) yields
d
dr
(piA + TL) = (c′A(xA) − c′A(0))
dxB
dr
≥ 0.
Therefore, the optimal royalty rate per output is ¯¯r . In this case r˜el = −p′xA. Comparing ¯¯r and
r˜el ,
¯¯r − r˜el = c′A(xA) − c′A(0) ≤ 0.
However, it is nonsense to impose a royalty larger than ¯¯r . The fixed license fee in this case is
negative as the following inequality shows
L = pxB − cA(xB) − r xB − pieB = −cA(0) − pieB < 0.
It compensates the profit of Firm B in the case of entry without license.
We have shown the following result.
9
Theorem 1. 1. If the innovating firm enters the market and at the same time licenses its
technology to the incumbent firm, and the cost functions of the firms are concave, the
optimal royalty rate per output for the innovating firm is one such that the output of the
incumbent firm is zero, that is, the royalty rate per output is prohibitive.
2. The fixed license fee in this case is negative.
Strictly convex cost function case
Assume that the cost functions of Firms A and B before adoption of the new technology
are cA(xA) and cB(xB) such that cA(xA) < cB(xB) for xA = xB, c′′A(·) > 0 and c′′B(·) > 0, or
c′A(x) > c′A(y) and c′B(x) > c′B(y) for x > y. The cost function of Firm B after adoption of the
new technology is cA(xB). (1) and (2) are rewritten as
p + p′xA − c′A(xA) = 0, (5)
and
p + p′xB − c′A(xB) − r = 0. (6)
Suppose xB = 0. Then,
r = p − c′A(0) = ¯¯r,
and
¯¯r + p′xA = c′A(xA) − c′A(0) > 0.
Substituting this and xB = 0 into (4) yields
d
dr
(piA + TL) = (c′A(xA) − c′A(0))
dxB
dr
< 0.
Therefore, there is an internal solution of the optimal royalty rate, r˜el = −p′xA > 0. It is
smaller than ¯¯r . From (5) and (6), xA is larger than xB.
We have shown the following result.
Theorem 2. 1. If the innovating firm enters the market and at the same time licenses its
technology to the incumbent firm, and the cost functions of the firms are strictly convex,
the optimal royalty rate per output for the innovating firm is positive and smaller than
one such that the output of the incumbent firm is zero.
2. The equilibrium output of Firm A is larger than that of Firm B.
The fixed license fee in this case may be positive or negative. Please see an example in the
next section.
4.4 The optimal strategy for the innovator
In this subsection we consider the optimal strategy for the innovating firm. The results depend
on the form of cost functions.
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Concave cost function case
When the cost functions of the firms are concave, entry with license strategy and license
without entry strategy are equivalent. In both cases the monopolistic situation is realized. In
the license without entry case the monopolist is Firm B, and in the case of entry with license
it is Firm A. Because the payoﬀ of Firm A in the monopolistic situation is larger than its profit
in the duopolistic situation when it enters the market without license, license without entry
strategy and entry with license strategy are optimal.
The monopoly profit including royalty revenue is maximized at zero royalty rate. Thus, the
optimal royalty rate in the case of license without entry is zero. On the other hand, in the
case of entry with license the market is duopolistic with small royalty rate. When the cost
functions are concave, the monopolistic situation is optimal for the innovating firm. Therefore,
the innovating firm gets larger profit by driving out the incumbent firm from the market with
prohibitive royalty rate. Then, we need negative fixed fee to compensate the profit of the
incumbent firm that it can get in the case of entry without license.
Strictly convex cost function case
In the case where Firm A enters the market with license, setting the value of r as one such that
the output of Firm B is zero, the monopolistic situation which is the same as that in the case of
license without entry can be realized. On the other hand, the optimal royalty rate per output is
diﬀerent from such a value. Therefore, entry with license strategy is optimal.
Summarizing the results in the following theorem;
Theorem 3. 1. When the cost functions of the firms are concave, license without entry
strategy and entry with license strategy are optimal for the innovating firm.
2. When the cost functions of the firms are strictly convex, entry with license strategy is
optimal for the innovating firm.
In the case of entry with license the market is duopolistic, and when the cost functions of
the firms are strictly convex, the payoﬀ of the innovating firm in duopolistic situation is larger
than that in monopolistic situation because partition of production between two firms is more
eﬃcient than concentration of production to one firm under strictly convex cost functions.
There is a positive internal solution of the optimal royalty rate which is not prohibitive.
5 An example of linear demand and quadratic cost function
case
The cost functions of Firms A and B before adoption of the new technology are cAx2A and cBx
2
B
with 0 < cA < cB. The cost function of Firm B after adoption of the new technology is cAx2B.
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5.1 Entry without license
Suppose that Firm A enters the market without license to Firm B. The inverse demand function
is assumed to be
p = a − xA − xB.
The profits of Firms A and B are
piA = (a − xA − xB)xA − cAx2A, piB = (a − xA − xB)xB − cBx2B.
The conditions for profit maximization of Firms A and B are
a − 2xA − xB − 2cAxA = 0, a − xA − 2xB − 2cBxB = 0.
The equilibrium outputs, price and profits are
xA =
a(2cB + 1)
4cAcB + 4cB + 4cA + 3
, xB =
a(2cA + 1)
4cAcB + 4cB + 4cA + 3
,
p =
a(2cA + 1)(2cB + 1)
4cAcB + 4cB + 4cA + 3
,
piA =
a2(cA + 1)(2cB + 1)2
(4cAcB + 4cB + 4cA + 3)2 , piB =
a2(2cA + 1)2(cB + 1)
(4cAcB + 4cB + 4cA + 3)2 .
Denote piA and piB in this case by pieA and pi
e
B.
5.2 License without entry
Next suppose that Firm A licenses its technology to Firm B using a combination of a royalty
per output and a fixed license fee, and does not enter the market. The inverse demand function
is
p = a − xB.
The profit of Firm B is
piB = (a − xB)xB − cAx2B − r xB − L.
The equilibrium output, price and profit are
xB =
a − r
2(cA + 1), p =
a + r + 2acA
2(cA + 1) , piB =
(a − r)2
4(cA + 1) − L.
Firm Bmust pay the diﬀerence between its profit net of the royalty and its profit in the previous
entry without license case as a fixed license fee. The fixed license fee, L, is determined so that
piB = pi
e
B is satisfied. Thus,
L =
(a − r)2
4(cA + 1) −
a2(2cA + 1)2(cB + 1)
(4cAcB + 4cB + 4cA + 3)2 =
A
4(cA + 1)(4cAcB + 4cB + 4cA + 3)2 .
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Denote the total license fee by TLl . Then,
TLl = L + r xB =
B
4(cA + 1)(4cAcB + 4cB + 4cA + 3)2) .
About details of A and B please see Appendix. Maximizing TLl with respect to r , the optimal
royalty rate is obtained as follows.
r˜ l = 0.
The fixed fee and the total license fee are equal to
L = TLl =
a2(16c2Ac2B + 32cAc2B + 16c2B − 16c3AcB + 36cAcB + 20cB − 16c3A − 16c2A + 4cA + 5)
4(cA + 1)(4cAcB + 4cB + 4cA + 3)2 .
5.3 Entry with license
Suppose that Firm A enters the market and at the same time licenses its technology to Firm
B using a combination of a royalty per output and a fixed license fee. The inverse demand
function is
p = a − xA − xB.
The profits of Firms A and B are
piA = (a − xA − xB)xA − cAx2A, piB = (a − xA − xB)xB − cAx2B − r xB − L.
The conditions for profit maximization of Firms A and B are
a − 2xA − xB − 2cAxA = 0, a − xA − 2xB − 2cAxB − r = 0.
The equilibrium outputs, price and profits are
xA =
a + r + 2acA
(2cA + 1)(2cA + 3), xB =
a − 2cAr − 2r + 2acA
(2cA + 1)(2cA + 3) , p =
a + r + 2acA
2cA + 3
,
piA =
(cA + 1)(r + 2acA + a)2
(2cA + 1)2(2cA + 3)2 , piB =
(cA + 1)(2cAr + 2r − 2acA − a)2
(2cA + 1)2(2cA + 3)2 − L.
Also in this case Firm B must pay the diﬀerence between its profit net of the royalty and its
profit in the entry without license case as a fixed license fee. The fixed license fee should be
equal to
L =
(cA + 1)(2cAr + 2r − 2acA − a)2
(2cA + 1)2(2cA + 3)2 −
a2(2cA + 1)2(cB + 1)
(4cAcB + 4cB + 4cA + 3)2
=
C
(2cA + 1)2(2cA + 3)2(4cAcB + 4cB + 4cA + 3)2 .
The total license fee is
TL = L + r xB =
D
(2cA + 1)2(2cA + 3)2(4cAcB + 4cB + 4cA + 3)2 .
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The total profit of Firm A is equal to
piA + TL =
E
(2cA + 1)2(2cA + 3)2(4cAcB + 4cB + 4cA + 3)2 .
About details of C, D and E please see Appendix. Firm A chooses r so as to maximize
piA + TL. We get the optimal royalty rate as follows;
r˜el =
4ac2A + 4acA + a
8c3A + 24c
2
A + 18cA + 2
> 0.
With this royalty rate the outputs of Firms A and B are
xA =
a(4c2A + 6cA + 1)
2(cA + 1)(4c2A + 8cA + 1)
> 0,
xB =
2acA
4c2A + 8cA + 1
> 0.
xB is positive and smaller than xA because
xA − xB = a(2cA + 1)2(cA + 1)(4c2A + 8cA + 1)
> 0.
The price of the good is
p =
a(2cA + 1)(4c2A + 6cA + 1)
2(cA + 1)(4c2A + 8cA + 1)
.
Comparing p with r˜el yields
p − r˜el = 2acA(2cA + 1)
4c2A + 8cA + 1
> 0.
Thus, 0 < r˜el < p.
The fixed license fee and the total profit of Firm A are
L =
a2F
(4c2A + 8cA + 1)2(4cAcB + 4cB + 4cA + 3)2
,
and
piA + TL =
a2G
4(cA + 1)(4c2A + 8cA + 1)(4cAcB + 4cB + 4cA + 3)2
.
About details of F and G please see Appendix. The fixed license fee, L, in this case may be
negative. Assume cB = 10, and denote cA = tcB, 0 < t < 1. Then, we obtain the relation
between t and L as depicted in Figure 1.
L is negative when 0 < t < 9647533554432 ≈ 0.00586 or 1 > t > 3011348333554432 ≈ 0.89745. Thus, when
the magnitude of the innovation is small or is very large, the fixed license fee is negative.
Denote the profit of Firm A in the market and the total license fee in this case by pielA and
TLel .
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Figure 1: Relation between t and L
5.4 The optimal strategy for the innovator
Let us compare pielA + TL
el and TLl ;
(pielA + TLel) − TLl =
a2c2A
(cA + 1)(4c2A + 8cA + 1)
> 0.
Compare TLl and pieA;
TLl − pieA =
a2H
4(cA + 1)(4c2A + 8cA + 1)(4cAcB + 4cB + 4cA + 3)2
> 0.
About details of H please see Appendix. Therefore, entry with license strategy is the optimal
strategy for the innovating firm.
6 Concluding Remark
We have analyzed the choice of options for the innovating firm under duopoly to enter the
market with or without licensing its cost-reducing technology to the incumbent firm, or to
license without entry, using a combination of a royalty per output and a fixed license fee. We
have shown that the results depend on the form of cost functions of the firms. In the future
research we want to extend the analysis in this paper to an oligopolistic situation.
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Appendix: Details of calculation
A =16c2Ac
2
Br
2 + 32cAc2Br
2 + 16c2Br
2 + 32c2AcBr
2 + 56cAcBr2 + 24cBr2 + 16c2Ar
2 + 24cAr2
+ 9r2 − 32ac2Ac2Br − 64acAc2Br − 32ac2Br − 64ac2AcBr − 112acAcBr − 48acBr − 32ac2Ar
− 48acAr − 18ar + 16a2c2Ac2B + 32a2cAc2B + 16a2c2B − 16a2c3AcB + 36a2cAcB + 20a2cB
− 16a2c3A − 16a2c2A + 4a2cA + 5a2,
B =16a2c2Ac
2
B + 32a
2cAc
2
B + 16a
2c2B − 16a2c3AcB + 36a2cAcB + 20a2cB − 16a2c3A
− 16a2c2A + 4a2cA + 5a2 − 16c2Ac2Br2 − 32cAc2Br2 − 16c2Br2 − 32c2AcBr2 − 56cAcBr2
− 24cBr2 − 16c2Ar2 − 24cAr2 − 9r2,
C =64c5Ac
2
Br
2 + 320c4Ac
2
Br
2 + 640c3Ac
2
Br
2 + 640c2Ac
2
Br
2 + 320cAc2Br
2 + 64c2Br
2
+ 128c5AcBr
2 + 608c4AcBr
2 + 1152c3AcBr
2 + 1088c2AcBr
2 + 512cAcBr2 + 96cBr2 + 64c5Ar
2
+ 288c4Ar
2 + 516c3Ar
2 + 460c2Ar
2 + 204cAr2 + 36r2 − 128ac5Ac2Br − 576ac4Ac2Br
− 1024ac3Ac2Br − 896ac2Ac2Br − 384acAc2Br − 64ac2Br − 256ac5AcBr − 1088ac4AcBr
− 1824ac3AcBr − 1504ac2AcBr − 608acAcBr − 96acBr − 128ac5Ar − 512ac4Ar − 808ac3Ar
− 628ac2Ar − 240acAr − 36ar + 64a2c5Ac2B + 256a2c4Ac2B + 400a2c3Ac2B + 304a2c2Ac2B
+ 112a2cAc2B + 16a
2c2B − 64a2c6AcB − 192a2c5AcB − 144a2c4AcB + 96a2c3AcB + 188a2c2AcB
+ 92a2cAcB + 15a2cB − 64a2c6A − 256a2c5A − 400a2c4A − 300a2c3A − 108a2c2A − 15a2cA,
D =96a2c3AcB + 188a
2c2AcB + 92a
2cAcB + 15a2cB − 64a2c6A − 256a2c5A − 400a2c4A
− 300a2c3A − 108a2c2A − 15a2cA − 64c5Ac2Br2 − 320c4Ac2Br2 − 608c3Ac2Br2
− 544c2Ac2Br2 − 224cAc2Br2 − 32c2Br2 − 128c5AcBr2 − 608c4AcBr2 − 1088c3AcBr2
− 912c2AcBr2 − 352cAcBr2 − 48cBr2 − 64c5Ar2 − 288c4Ar2 − 484c3Ar2 − 380c2Ar2 − 138cAr2
− 18r2 − 32ac3Ac2Br − 80ac2Ac2Br − 64acAc2Br − 16ac2Br − 64ac3AcBr − 144ac2AcBr
− 104acAcBr − 24acBr − 32ac3Ar − 64ac2Ar − 42acAr − 9ar + 64a2c5Ac2B + 256a2c4Ac2B
+ 400a2c3Ac
2
B + 304a
2c2Ac
2
B + 112a
2cAc
2
B + 16a
2c2B − 64a2c6AcB − 192a2c5AcB
− 144a2c4AcB,
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E =336a2c4AcB + 800a
2c3AcB + 692a
2c2AcB + 268a
2cAcB + 39a2cB − 64a2c6A
− 192a2c5A − 176a2c4A + 8a2c3A + 100a2c2A + 54a2cA + 9a2 − 64c5Ac2Br2 − 320c4Ac2Br2
− 592c3Ac2Br2 − 496c2Ac2Br2 − 176cAc2Br2 − 16c2Br2 − 128c5AcBr2 − 608c4AcBr2
− 1056c3AcBr2 − 824c2AcBr2 − 272cAcBr2 − 24cBr2 − 64c5Ar2 − 288c4Ar2 − 468c3Ar2
− 340c2Ar2 − 105cAr2 − 9r2 + 64ac4Ac2Br + 192ac3Ac2Br + 208ac2Ac2Br + 96acAc2Br
+ 16ac2Br + 128ac
4
AcBr + 352ac
3
AcBr + 352ac
2
AcBr + 152acAcBr + 24acBr + 64ac
4
Ar
+ 160ac3Ar + 148ac
2
Ar + 60acAr + 9ar + 128a
2c5Ac
2
B + 512a
2c4Ac
2
B + 800a
2c3Ac
2
B
+ 608a2c2Ac
2
B + 224a
2cAc
2
B + 32a
2c2B − 64a2c6AcB − 64a2c5AcB,
F =64c5Ac
2
B + 192c
4
Ac
2
B + 192c
3
Ac
2
B + 64c
2
Ac
2
B − 64c6AcB − 192c5AcB − 208c4AcB
− 96c3AcB − 44c2AcB − 20cAcB − cB − 64c6A − 256c5A − 400c4A − 284c3A − 104c2A − 20cA − 1,
G =128c4Ac
2
B + 384c
3
Ac
2
B + 400c
2
Ac
2
B + 160cAc
2
B + 16c
2
B − 64c5AcB + 352c3AcB
+ 464c2AcB + 196cAcB + 20cB − 64c5A − 128c4A − 32c3A + 72c2A + 44cA + 5,
H =64c4Ac
2
B + 128c
3
Ac
2
B + 64c
2
Ac
2
B − 64c5AcB − 64c4AcB + 96c3AcB + 128c2AcB
+ 36cAcB + 4cB − 64c5A − 144c4A − 96c3A − 12c2A + 4cA + 1
=64c4AcB(cB − cA) + 64c3A(2c2B − cAcB − c2A) + 16c2A(4c2B + 6cAcB − 9c2A)
+ 32c2A(4cB − 3cA) + 12cA(3cB − cA) + 4(cB − cA) + 1 > 0.
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